We introduce several notions of potentials for mechanism design problems with interdependent values, and relate them to implementation in ex-post equilibrium. Whereas ex-post implementation is closely linked to the ordinal concept of best-alternative potentials, the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism corresponds to the stronger notion of a cardinal potential: agents agree not only on the best alternative, but also on the quantitative di¤erences between all alternatives. We characterize all valuations that allow for cardinal potentials, and use this characterization for: 1) Identifying valuations for which ex-post implementation is possible; 2) Identifying classes of valuations for which all ex-post implementable choice rules correspond to cardinal potentials. The latter allows us to extend to interdependent valuations a result for dominant strategy implementation in private values settings, due to Roberts (1979) .
Introduction
We introduce several notions of potentials for mechanism design problems with interdependent values, discuss their properties, and establish relations between these notions and ex-post implementation. Roughly speaking, a mechanism design problem with given valuation functions admits a potential if there exist monetary transfers such that the maximization problem of each We wish to thank an associate editor, two anonymous referees, Paul Milgrom and Burkhard Schipper for helpful comments and stimulating remarks. Jehiel: PSE Paris and UCL London, jehiel@enpc.fr; Meyer-ter-Vehn and Moldovanu: University of Bonn, moritz_mtv@web.de, mold@uni-bonn.de agent coincides with the problem of maximizing a single "potential" function, common to all agents 1 . Thus, the existence of a potential suggests the possibility of aligning the interests of all agents.
Aligning the interests of heterogenous strategic agents that jointly control a decision is a central desideratum in mechanism design and implementation. By attaching di¤erent monetary transfers to di¤erent social alternatives, the designer can a¤ect the agents' preferences over these alternatives so that, ultimately, all agents agree about the preferred alternative, and hence all agents …nd it in their own strategic interest to behave in a way that leads to the commonly preferred alternative.
The most famous example of successful alignment is o¤ered by the VickreyClarke-Groves mechanisms (see Vickrey (1961) , Clarke (1971) , and Groves (1973) ) for private values environments with quasi-linear utility. There, an agent receives a transfer equal to the sum of valuations of the other agents in the chosen social alternative. With such transfers all individual payo¤ maximization decision problems coincide with the maximization of social surplus, yielding the well-known dominant strategy implementability of the e¢ cient choice rule.
The notions of interest alignment analyzed in the present paper bear a strong formal resemblance to potentials for normal form games, de…ned by Monderer and Shapley (1996) . Roughly speaking, a normal form game admits a potential if there exists a function (common to all players) from strategy pro…les to the set of real numbers such that, for any player, changes in utility resulting from changes in own strategy (while keeping …xed others' strategies) are re ‡ected in appropriate changes in the value of the common potential function. A main result is that a strategy pro…le is a Nash equilibrium of the original game if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium of the arti…cial game where each player's utility function is replaced by the common potential. Thus, the equilibria of strategic interaction in a potential game are mirrored in a much simpler game where all players' interests are identical.
Following the literature on potential games, we shall distinguish between best-alternative, ordinal and cardinal potentials. The …rst, weakest, concept says that the potential function and each agent's payo¤ function agree on the best alternative; the second requires that the potential function agrees with every agent's preference order over all alternatives; the third, strongest, concept requires that the potential function coincides, up to an a¢ ne transformation, with each agent's utility function (as is the case for social surplus in the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism).
Whereas in Monderer and Shapley's general setting a potential need not have an economic interpretation related to the game's features (see for example their derivation of a potential for a Cournot oligopoly), a potential in our mechanism design problem is closely related to the choice rule that is being implemented through the alignment of interests induced by that potential. In spite of the formal resemblance, the links between potentials in mechanism design and potential games are not immediate. Whereas an agent's preferences over her strategies are preserved by the potential function in a potential game, her preferences over alternatives are explicitly altered, via transfers, in the potential function for a mechanism design problem. It is also not true that a mechanism that admits a potential gives rise to a potential game in the corresponding revelation game 2 . Our present focus is on ex-post implementation -a weakening of dominant strategy implementation, appropriate also for settings with interdependent valuations. This notion requires that an agent is not willing to change her strategy for any type realization of the other agents. Ex-post implementation has recently received a lot of attention 3 because it ensures that neither the mechanism designer, nor the agents need to know the distribution from which signals are drawn in order to design the mechanism or to play optimally in the induced game 4 . Via a taxation principle, it can be easily shown, that best-alternative potentials are equivalent to ex-post implementable choice rules. Thus, statements over implementable choice rules can be translated into statements about best-alternative potentials 5 . Ordinal potentials go beyond ex-post implementation by requiring that, after eventual transfers, agents agree over the ranking of all alternatives (rather than just the best alternative), and 2 In contrast, Sandholm (2005) shows how a price scheme administered by a designer can be used to augment an externality abatement game in order to yield a potential game a la Monderer-Shapley. A dynamic learning process leads there to an e¢ cient outcome. Compare Example 6.4. . 4 See Bergemann and Morris (2005) for a formal treatment of this issue, and for the connection to "Wilson's doctrine" about detail-free mechanisms. 5 Potentials should be seen as o¤ering a di¤erent interpretation of the mechanism design problem. Whereas the latter studies joint decisions based on agents' signals (while providing incentives for truthful revelation), the former focuses on the aggregation of agents preferences.
cardinal potentials go even further by requiring that agents' utilities ultimately agree up to a¢ ne transformations. While implementation theory has essentially focused on best-alternative potentials, ordinal and cardinal potentials o¤er stronger notions of interest alignment, which should be attractive for a number of applications 6 . In particular, as mentioned above, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms correspond to cardinal potentials.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we describe the mechanism design problem with interdependent values, and state a well-known taxation principle. In Section 3 we de…ne several notions of potentials, and link potentials to implementation in ex-post equilibria (Proposition 3.4).
In Section 4 we use existing results from the theory on potential games in order to provide conditions for the existence of cardinal potentials (Proposition 4.1). Roughly speaking, the existence of cardinal potentials requires, for each alternative k; the identity of the cross derivatives of agent i's and j's valuations with respect to the signals held by i and j. Equivalently, as shown by Ui (2000) , this requirement can be expressed as a separability condition on the valuation functions.
It is a-priori not straightforward to determine whether ex-post implementation is possible for given valuation functions. But, the above su¢ cient conditions are readily checked. Furthermore, the conditions are constructive in the sense that, when satis…ed, they indicate how to construct the cardinal potential, the implemented choice rule and the necessary transfers. If the conditions are not satis…ed, however, ex-post implementation via weaker notions of potentials may still be possible.
After recalling that, with generic interdependent valuation functions, only constant choice rules can be ex-post implemented (see Jehiel et al., 2006) , we next consider settings in which cardinal potentials exist. Our main question is whether and when all ex-post implementable choice rules can be represented by cardinal potentials in such cases.
Our main results can be summarized as follows: Of course, the same questions about relations between best-alternative and cardinal potentials can be asked in private values settings. As mentioned above, the classic work of Vickrey, Clarke, and Groves implies that the maximization of social surplus is implementable and corresponds to a cardinal potential. But, their work leaves open the question whether some alternative choice rules can be implemented in dominant strategies without corresponding to cardinal potentials. In a remarkable paper, Roberts (1979) shows that, in a su¢ ciently rich, high-dimensional environment, deterministic implementation in dominant strategy boils down to a¢ ne maximization 7 . Since a¢ ne maximizers are cardinal potentials, cardinal and best-alternative potentials coincide in the environments studied by Roberts. In fact, we heavily use Roberts'result for our analysis of the interdependent but separable values case. Bikhchandani et al. (2006) characterize dominant strategy implementation for private values settings in terms of a monotonicity condition 8 . The fundamental di¤erence to Roberts'work is that these authors consider a restricted domain of preferences, better suited to some of the applications they 7 Lavi et al. (2004) o¤er alternative proofs for Roberts' main result, and for another characterization result (that uses a condition of "player-decisiveness"), due to Meyer-terVehn and Moldovanu (2002). 8 Similar characterizations in terms of a "no cycle condition" are given by Gui et al. (2004) . Their work builds on an earlier insight about monotonicity properties of subdifferentials of convex functions, due to Rochet (1987) . have in mind (e.g., combinatorial auctions without externalities). In particular, the characterization of dominant strategy implementable choice rules as a¢ ne maximizers does not hold anymore in their framework. Thus, in restricted, private-values domains, best-alternative and cardinal potentials need not coincide.
There are two appendices: Appendix A recalls the original de…nitions of potential games and the main result of Monderer and Shapley (1996) , and it shows that mechanism design problems generally do not give rise to potential games. Appendix B contains several proofs that would interrupt the ‡ow of argument in the main text.
The Mechanism Design Model
We consider a situation where N 2 N agents i 2 N are a¤ected by a decision among i -dimensional vector of partial derivatives with respect to s i and assume that the value di¤erence between any two alternatives k; l is not satiated in one's own signal s i :
Given an in…nitesimal change ds i of i's signal, we denote by dv
We study choice rules : S ! K with the property that there are transfers functions t = (t i ) i2N : S ! R N such that truth-telling almost everywhere is an ex-post equilibrium in the incomplete information game that is induced by the direct revelation mechanism ( ; t), i.e.
for all agents i, almost all signal pro…les s = (s i ; s i ) and all possible misrepresentations of i's signal e s i 2 S i . We shall call such implementable (a.e.) and ( ; t) an incentive compatible mechanism (a.e.), and will suppress the "(a.e.)" from here on 9 . Consider an incentive compatible mechanism ( ; t) : By Fubini's Theorem, for almost all s i 2 S i , the set S i (s i ) S i of other agents'signals s i such that constraint (2) is violated for s = (s i ; s i ) and some misrepresentation e s i 2 S i is a null-set. Thus almost all types s i …nd it optimal to truthfully report their type given truthful reporting by the other agents, and given any continuous type distribution over S i . We call two choice rules ; 0 equivalent if they agree on the chosen alternative (s) = 0 (s) for almost all signal pro…les s 2 S; we call exhaustive if every alternative k is chosen on some set S (k) of states with positive measure; we call trivial if it chooses the same alternative k in almost all states s.
We conclude this section by stating a "taxation principle" for ex-post implementation, …rst pointed out by Chung and Ely (2001) . This is a multiagent generalization of a well-known idea in the monopolistic screening literature: Instead of asking an individual for her information and deciding on an alternative and a transfer based on the report, the central authority can, equivalently, post prices for the di¤erent alternatives and let the individual choose among them. In our setting with multiple agents, these prices are personalized and depend on the signals of the other agents. In equilibrium all agents must agree on the best alternative. 
K n ( 1; ::::; 1) 10 , such that for almost all s it holds that:
. Agent i's problem in the game induced by the mechanism ( ; t) 9 The reason for requiring optimality almost everywhere rather than everywhere is that we want to allow some leeway on zero-measure sets of signals where agents are indi¤erent between multiple alternatives. This avoids tedious technical details in the de…nition of best-alternative and ordinal potentials in equations (5) and (6), while allowing us to focus on the main economic insights implied by ex-post implementation.
Results on the restrictiveness of ex-post implementation, such as the those in Jehiel et al. (2006) and Proposition 4.4 below, generalize to choice rules that are implementable almost everywhere, as the geometric condition driving the result is determined by the incentive constraints in a whole neighborhood (with positive measure) of the indi¤erence set. 10 It is necessary to allow for t i k s i = 1 for some alternative k in order to ensure that
On the other hand one cannot allow for t i k s i = 1 for all alternatives k, as this would make agent i indi¤erent between all alternatives, and yield him in…nite disutility. 
Note that t i k (s i ) is well-de…ned since, by i's incentive constraint,
By i's incentive constraint we know that she reports in a way that maximizes her payo¤. Thus, with t
3 Preference Aggregation via Potentials
::::; 1) such that, at almost every state of the world s; the potential agrees with each agent i on the most favored alternative(s) k:
K n ( 1; ::::; 1) such that, at almost every state of the world s; the potential agrees with each agent i on the preference order of alternatives:
K n ( 1; ::::; 1) such that, at almost every state of the world s; the utility of each agent i coincides with the potential up to an ( i ; i )-a¢ ne transformation:
A cardinal potential that is achieved through weights i will be called an -potential.
The above de…nitions closely parallel those for potential games (see Appendix A). Note that in the de…nition of a cardinal potential we can always choose i = 0 without loss of generality: if P = (P k ) k2K is a cardinal potential for some f(
This justi…es the terminology for -potentials.
The following result summarizes the simple relations among the above notions: Proposition 3.2 An ordinal potential for valuations v is a fortiori a bestalternative potential. A cardinal potential for valuations v is a fortiori an ordinal potential.
Proof. If P is an ordinal potential, condition (6) obviously implies equation (5) and P is a best-alternative potential.
If P is an -potential, i > 0 ensures that condition (6) is satis…ed. Recall that a choice rule identi…es a unique "best" alternative for each pro…le of signals. Thus, it is not surprising that implementable choice rules are closely related to best-alternative potentials. We now formally express this connection. Proposition 3.4 There is a one-to-one relation between equivalence classes of best-alternative potentials P and equivalence classes of ex-post implementable choice rules .
Proof. We de…ne for each class of best-alternative potentials P an equivalence class = P of implementable choice rules, and we then show that is a bijection. Given P with representative P 2 P , de…ne = P by de…ning a representative 2 with (s) 2 arg max k fP k (s)g. By the taxation principle, the de…ned choice rule is implementable. In order for to be well-de…ned 11 For i = 0, consider the transfers b t (1), and by the de…nition of best-alternative potentials, condition (5), the set arg max k fP k (s)g is a singleton for almost all s.
we need to check that = P does not depend on the choice of P 2 P in the construction of . However, this is obvious from De…nition 3.3.
To prove that is one-to-one, observe that P = P 0 implies that arg max k fP k (s)g = arg max k fP 0 k (s)g for all P 2 P; P 0 2 P 0 and for almost all s 2 S. Thus we get that P = P 0 , proving that is injective. Finally, the taxation principle yields for a given implementable choice rule that
de…nes a best-alternative potential with P = , yielding surjectivity.
Cardinal Potentials
It is obvious form the work of Vickrey, Clarke and Groves and from the above de…nitions that social surplus
is a cardinal potential for private values settings. Thus, if valuations are private, dominant-strategy implementation of the e¢ cient choice rule can be achieved via the strong notion of cardinal potentials.
We next give a condition for the existence of cardinal potentials in interdependent values settings. This condition is not satis…ed for generic valuations, and hence ex-post implementation via cardinal potentials is generically impossible. But, the non-generic set of valuation functions that allow for cardinal potentials goes far beyond private values, and these more general families of valuations play a role in various applications. 2. There exist functions P k : S ! R and Q i k : S i ! R for all k and i, such that:
Existence of Cardinal Potentials
3. For all agents i; j and alternatives k, the cross-di¤erences in the valuations coincide:
i
4. There exists a family of functions I k : S I ! R for each subset of agents I N such that:
The family
is called an interaction potential and de…nes the potential function P k (s) = P
For the proof of Proposition 4.1 it is convenient to …rst establish a formal link between potentials for mechanism design problems and potentials for normal form games. This will allow us to use several known results from the latter theory.
Given valuations v and given an alternative k 2 K, consider an arti…cial game in normal form k (v) where the set of players is N , the set of strategies of player i 2 N is S i ; and the payo¤ function of player i is v
Lemma 4.2 A family P = (P k ) k2K of functions P k : S ! R is anpotential for v if and only if, for each k 2 K; the function P k is an -potential for the game k (v) 13 .
Proof. By the de…nition of potentials for normal form games (see Appendix A), P k is an -potential for the game k (v) if and only if
holds for all s i ; t i 2 S i ; s i 2 S i and i 2 N : This condition is equivalent to the existences of functions
for all s 2 S and i 2 N 14 . Armed with the above Lemma, we now prove Proposition 4.1: Proof. "1 , 2" follows from an immediate transformation of equation (7) by setting
"1 , 3" follows from a path-integral argument, standard in the physics literature, that has been applied to potential games by Monderer and Shapley (1996) . By their Corollary 2.9, condition (9) is equivalent to the fact that k (v) is a potential game. The result follows then by Lemma 4.2.
"1 , 4" follows from Lemma 4.2 and from the analogous result on potentials for normal form games, due to Ui (2000) .
For given valuations v, identities (9) provide an easy way to check whether implementation via cardinal potentials is possible or not. Moreover, when identities (9) hold it is fairly easy to construct the associated -potentials. For the sake of illustration, assume that there are two agents i, j, that each agent holds a one-dimensional signal s i 2 R + , that v i k are smooth functions of s i and s j , and that identities (9) hold for all k and = (1; 1). Then P = (P k ) k2K is an -potential if and only if there exist k such that
Note that the conditions imposed by identities (9) are non-generic in the sense that if the valuations are "drawn randomly", identities (9) will typically not be satis…ed. But, as highlighted by the equivalent conditions (8) or (10), the set of valuation functions that allow for implementation via cardinal potentials goes far beyond the private valuations case. These equivalent conditions provide alternative simple representations of those systems of valuation functions that admit an -potential, such as the settings with separable or semi-separable valuations analyzed below.
Implementation via Cardinal Potentials
Having identi…ed the conditions for the existence of cardinal potentials, we now turn to a systematic study of the following question: Assuming the existence of cardinal potential, we ask oursleves whether and when it is the case that all best-alternative potentials (or equivalently, ex-post implementatable choice rules) are cardinal potentials? As we shall see, this study also reveals interesting classes of valuations for which ex-post implementation is possible.
To get a ‡avor of the di¤erence between best-alternative and cardinal potentials, let us give an interpretation of cardinal potentials in terms of rates of information substitution. Given a cardinal potential P that represents an implementable choice rule , and an "indi¤erence point" s where arg max k 0 fP k 0 (s)g = fk; lg ; let us consider an in…nitesimal change (ds i ; ds j ) in the signals of agents i and j that does not a¤ect their preferences between alternatives k and l:
By the de…nition of the cardinal potential we get that
which can be expressed as
The left hand side of the above equation can be interpreted as a rate of information substitution. It compares the change in i's preference of alternative k over l due to an in…nitesimal change of her signal with the analogous term for agent j. A high value for this quotient signi…es that a large change in i's preference is needed to o¤set a smaller change in agent j's valuation. Thus, agent j can be considered to be "more important"to the decision making. Equation (11) says that this rate needs to be independent of the chosen alternatives k; l and of the indi¤erence signal s. But, there is no a-priori reason why this strong requirement should be satis…ed by an arbitray implementable choice rule (or by an arbitrary best-alternative potential). Indeed, we …nd that this condition is not generally satis…ed by arbitrary implementable choice rules in settings with one-dimensional signals (compare with Figure 1) .
By contrast, in many settings with multi-dimensional signals admitting a cardinal potential, we …nd the surprising result that almost every bestalternative potentials is equivalent to some cardinal potential, thereby implying that the strong information substitution condition is satis…ed by almost all implementable choice rules.
The next three subsections analyze settings with multi-dimensional signals and proceed from general valuations to more and more restricted ones. In particular, we get larger and larger families of choice rules that can be ex-post implemented. The last subsection considers settings with one-dimensional signals.
Generic Multi-dimensional Settings
Jehiel et al. (2006) have shown that for generic 16 valuation functions any ex-post implementable choice rule must be constant (i.e., it can make no use of private information). In other words, any best-alternative potential is trivial. Since cardinal potentials are a-fortiori best-alternative potentials, we obtain: 
Semi-Separable Valuations
We now focus on the less general class of settings with valuation functions that allow for the existence of a cardinal potential P , characterized in Proposition 4.1.
By the de…nition of potentials, we know that the choice rule represented by the potential (s) 2 arg max k fP k (s)g is implementable, and it is easy to see that the same holds for all rules represented by its translates: (s) 2 arg max k fP k (s) + k g, for any vector of real numbers ( k ) k . The next result says that, beyond these choice rules, only trivial rules are implementable. 2006), and we ask the reader to consult that paper for details.
For an intuition, assume that the signal spaces are
, that there are only 2 agents and 2 alternatives, k and l; assume that i = j = 1 and normalize
; and let ( ; t) be an ex-post incentive compatible mechanism with t In other words, the vectors
must be parallel for all s 2 I.
Fix now an indi¤erence signal b
If the common value part P k is a "randomly drawn" generic function, the direction of the gradient r s i P k (s) will vary in s j . The only way by which the term r s i Q j k + t j k (s i ), which cannot depend on s j , can remain parallel to all these multiple directions is by having
The assertion follows then by the taxation principle. The proof is completed by discarding the di¤erentiability (and continuity) assumption on the transfer functions, and by showing that the set of functions fP k g k for which the gradient r s i P k (s) varies in s j on every possible indi¤erence set of P k is residual and …nitely prevalent in the Banach space of su¢ ciently smooth functions (see Jehiel et al., 2006) .
Finally, note that the restriction on valuations that admit cardinal potentials is stronger than necessary in order to avoid the negative result of Proposition 4.3. Intuitively, this class of valuations is small within the class of valuations that allow for a non-trivial best-alternative potential: given valuations that admit a cardinal potential, only a¢ ne transformations of these valuations preserve the property that a cardinal potential exists, whereas a best-alternative potential will still exist for any monotone transformation; moreover, the set of a¢ ne transformations is small in the set of all monotone transformations. Thus, the present results do not imply that for all "reasonable" classes of valuations over multi-dimensional signals, best-alternative potentials and cardinal potentials coincide 17 18 .
Separable Valuations
In this subsection we restrict valuations even further, and we focus on interdependent, yet separable valuation functions of the form
for some functions f
De…nition 4.5 A choice rule : S ! K is said to be an a¢ ne maximizer if and only if it is of the form:
for agent-speci…c weights i 0 and alternative-speci…c weights k 2 R.
For a given a¢ ne maximizer, the weight i can be interpreted as the importance of agent i's information to the social choice, and the weight k as the designer's preference for alternative k. Note also that, for private values, a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism is simply the a¢ ne maximizer with weights i = 1; k = 0: A¢ ne maximizers with weights i > 0 can be implemented by transfers
Consider now a vector 0 . By de…ning
we obtain:
for a¢ ne maximizers : Thus, separable valuations admit an potential for any >> 0; and they constitute a (non-generic) subcase of the semi-separable valuation functions studied in Subsection 4.2.2 where, in contrast, the cardinal representation is generically unique (up to a multiplicative constant). The present non-genericity arises because 8i; k; s; we have
@s i @s j = 0 in the class of separable valuations, whereas, for semi-separable valuations,
@s i @s j is proportional to @P k (s) @s i @s j which is allowed to vary in an arbitrary way. Since r s i P k (s) does not vary here in s j ; we cannot apply the method of proof illustrated in the above section. Quite surprisingly, by using a remarkable result about dominant strategy implementation for settings with private values and multi-dimensional signals due to Roberts (1979) , we are nevertheless able to prove a result similar to Proposition 4.4 (albeit under additional technical conditions): for separable valuations, the only implementable rules are a¢ ne maximizers. Thus, for all separable valuations, almost all implementable choice rules are represented by cardinal potentials. Exceptions are choice rules corresponding to a¢ ne maximizers where i = 0 for some i: Such an a¢ ne maximizer is not a cardinal potential because De…nition 3.1 insists that even an agent i with i = 0 should have the same cardinal preference as the other agents. This requirement does not show up in the conditions for ex-post implementation since this agent's report can simply be ignored.
The following simple lemma explains why we can use here a result that was obtained for settings with private values: Proof. See Appendix B. Our main result in this subsection is:
, and that K 3. Then every implementable, exhaustive choice rule is an a¢ ne maximizer. Thus, almost all implementable choice rules are represented by cardinal potentials.
The proof of Proposition 4.7 is based on a hyperplane separation argument due to Roberts (1979) who proved a similar result for dominant strategy implementation with private values, i.e. for S i = R K ; f i = id; h i = 0. Our proof adapts Roberts'insight by showing that there is no loss of generality in assuming that an ex-post implementable choice rule takes only payo¤ relevant information into account. This means that factors through f , i.e. for X = R K N there exists a function : X ! K such that = f . The assumptions in Proposition 4.7 cannot be relaxed. If there are only two alternatives (i.e., K = 2), a characterization of dominant strategy implementable choice rules in a private values setting has been obtained by La¤ont and Maskin (1982) . Their characterization generalizes to separable, interdependent valuations, and yields a larger set than the set of a¢ ne maximizers. For bounded valuations f i (S i ) R K , an example of an implementable choice rule that is not an a¢ ne maximizer is available from the authors upon request. Figure 1 shows that, for a general implementable ; the rate of information substitution
is not constant, and thus cannot be represented by a cardinal potential.
Conclusion
Using ideas from the theory of potential games, we have introduced to mechanism design new notions of alignment between individual and social preferences, and we related these notions to ex-post implementation. We have characterized valuation functions that admit cardinal potentials. Since the required conditions are very easily checked, our results o¤er simple methods to construct the potentials and the corresponding transfers needed to implement them. Moreover, for settings with multi-dimensional type spaces that admit a cardinal potential and that are generic (within the class of such settings), we have established that almost all implementable choice rules maximize this potential or its translates. The class of separable valuations constitutes a non-generic sub-class, and the extra freedom leads there to the possibility of implementing the larger class of a¢ ne maximizers. Virtually all a¢ ne maximizers are cardinal potentials and we show that beyond them no additional choice rules are implementable.
To conclude, the focus on cardinal potentials and on the derived possibility results for ex-post implementation constitute, in our view, a significant complement to the earlier impossibility result for generic valuations with multi-dimensional signals (see Jehiel, Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moldovanu and Zame, 2006).
Appendix A: Potential Games
We brie ‡y review the original de…nitions of potentials for normal form, complete information games due to Monderer and Shapley (1996) . Let 
for every x; z 2 Y i : If we are not interested in the value of we simply speak of a cardinal potential:
for every x; z 2 Y i :
An analogue for best-alternative potentials was de…ned by Dubey et al. 
The following result shows how potentials align the agents'interests:
Proposition 6.3 (Monderer and Shapley (1996)) Let P be an ordinal potential for (u 1 ; u 2 ; :::; u n ): Then a strategy pro…le is a Nash equilibrium of (u 1 ; u 2 ; :::; u n ) if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium of (P; P; :::; P ).
Proof. By de…nition, (P; P; :::; P ) has the same best-response correspondence as (u 1 ; u 2 ; :::; u n ); which immediately implies the result.
Potentials and Potential Games
From the above de…nitions it seems a-priori plausible to assume that a potential P = (P k ) k2K for valuations v gives rise to a potential for the revelation game that implements an associated choice rule 2 P . In fact, Sandholm (2005) shows how an externality abatement mechanism gives rise to a potential game. The following result is a crucial ingredient for the proof of Proposition 4.7. It is also interesting in its own right, as it establishes a monotonicity property of implementable choice rules. 
Proof of Lemma 7.1. By the taxation principle, there are trans-
, it is immediate that l can not be preferred at signal s 0i : Thus, l = 2 arg max k 0 fv i k 0 (s 0 ) + t i k 0 (s i )g. By the taxation principle, we can conclude that (s 0 ) 6 = l. Proof of Proposition 4.7. We use an important result due to Roberts (1979) who studied deterministic choice rules that are implementable in dominant strategies in a private values setting. Roberts showed that such rules must satisfy a monotonicity condition, called PAD. Using our notation, his proof relies on the following technical result 21 : Theorem A (Roberts 1979 ): Let X = R K N and assume that K 3. Then any function : X ! K which satis…es PAD is an a¢ ne maximizer.
Here PAD means that for x; x 0 2 X such that x o . It remains to show that the above assertion holds also for the cases where : S ! K does not factor through f . This proof can be broken down into three steps: a) Slightly change to a function e that factors e = f ; b.) Show that e is ex-post implementable, and apply Theorem A to to show that e is an a¢ ne maximizer; c) Show that is an a¢ ne maximizer if e is one. a) Given functions ; s i . The …rst and third equality follow by the de…nitions of e and e t , and the inequality follows by the ex-post incentive compatibility of ( ; t). By Lemma 7.1, e satis…es monotonicity, which in turn means that : R K N ! K satis…es PAD in the sense of Roberts' Theorem A. Thus, there are constants j 0 for j 2 N and k for k 2 K such that (f (s)) 2 arg max k2K n P N j=1 j f j k (s j ) + k o for all s 2 S: This proves that e is an a¢ ne maximizer. c) We now return to the original choice rule . We will derive a contradiction by assuming that there exists s 2 S such that (s) = l = 2 arg max k2K n P N 
